The Image of Cognition

Introduction

If we were to say that there is a method to philosophy or being philosophical, determining and questioning what postulates, axioms or presuppositions we have, is a good first step. Critical thinking is the evaluation of our beliefs, thoughts, evidence and arguments, which also includes a critical or skeptical analysis of our assumptions. Many major philosophers begin their discourse with a ‘profound’ skepticism of previous assumptions, as we see in Plato’s allegory of the cave, Descartes' Meditations, Kant’s Idealism, or Hume’s skepticism. A tradition in the history of philosophy can be understood as being skeptical of assumptions and even dispensing one’s philosophical inquiry of any assumptions identified. 

Deleuze takes an even grander approach by not focusing on a specific axiom or assumption in particular, but questions and demonstrates how it is not the content of our beliefs in philosophy that has been of issue, but the manner or mode of which we are philosophizing. He brings into question the presuppositions that are implicit in the philosophical tradition. These implicit assumptions are embedded into thought itself, how we think, what thinking is, and how this has impacted and limited all previous philosophical trajectories. A mistake has been occurring and until it is identified and overcome, according to Deleuze, philosophy has not actually begun. 

To this end, Deleuze’s book Difference and Repetition engages in an analysis of philosophical presuppositions in the chapter ‘Image of Thought.’ I will be exploring what Deleuze’s arguments are for this mistake in philosophy. I will explore the notion of implicit/subjective presuppositions in general, common sense, the foundations of  transcendental empiricism through recognition, and good sense. I argue that these implicit assumptions are not of the same philosophical kind as others because they are embedded into the cognitive structure of how our mind works. 

Deleuze’s empirical transcendentalism is an awareness of how our cognition impacts our capacity to philosophize and the history of philosophy. If we truly embrace a ‘tabula rasa’ approach to being philosophical, a blank slate of no assumptions, we must be conscious of how our mind habituates thought so that we can break free from a dogmatic cycle. It may also be the case that since our minds are constructed this way, we can never escape the image of thought. 

Implicit Presuppositions

Deleuze begins this chapter in a similar way as Descartes does in his Meditations, through skepticism. The skepticism Descartes used which led him to the cogito, ‘I think, I exist,’ was to not accept the assumption that man is defined as a rational animal. This would have been a conceptual presupposition, for which Descartes applied the process of skepticism and attempted to begin anew, without taking anything for granted, conceptually. 

The skepticism Deleuze engages in is not of the conceptual presuppositions in the history of philosophy but of another. He distinguishes between two types of presuppositions: objective and subjective. Objective presuppositions are those found within concepts themselves. Scientific axioms, analytic truths, and conceptual assumptions can be methodologically evaluated through modes of inquiry. This is generally what people think of when ‘philosophizing’ comes to mind; a mode of conceptual analysis and reasoning. The height of intellectual honesty is to ‘give up’ on a belief when it is found to be conceptually incoherent or unfounded as an axiom of some theoretical or belief system. 

Subjective presuppositions are not found in concepts, but implicit presumptions of the form ‘everybody knows;’ for example, what a self, being and thinking is. (129) The cogito Descartes develops,

“I think, therefore I am,”

attempts to remove presuppositions by beginning with ‘I think.” However, Deleuze discussed how the ‘I think,’ still has presuppositions in the sensible empirical self, pure being, or in Heidegger’s preontological Being. (129)

The genus of philosophy, the larger category or higher orderness hierarchically, is the task of questioning assumptions. The difference or subcategories, would be how specific philosophers go about challenging assumptions, like an empiricist or rationalist tradition. Deleuze thinks each of these approaches is lacking in what it means to be philosophical or at least fails at ‘true’ philosophical beginning. Systematically, each philosopher is condemned by the image of thought and the implicit presuppositions embedded in how they are ‘thinking.’

Deleuze states,

“We may conclude that there is no true beginning in philosophy, or rather that the true philosophical beginning, Difference, is in-itself already Repetition.” (Deleuze 129)

If the genus of philosophy is a beginning of the removal of all presuppositions, every attempt at this, a difference, is a repetition of the same mistake. This repetition is to ignore the implicit, subjective presuppositions and be captured by the image of thought. If difference is something new, it cannot be something that was repeated. The repetition is of a failed difference, failed beginnings of philosophy. 

Deleuze is arguing that each of these philosophical approaches is a repetition of the same mistake. He sees philosophy moving in a circular fashion, focused on conceptual analysis and ignoring what we think we know implicitly. As long a philosophy continues in this cycle, it cannot actually begin. 

The subjective presuppositions in the form of pre-philosophical/conceptual assumptions that Deleuze is identifying can be understood by the statement,

“everybody knows, no one can deny.” (Deleuze 130)

In the context of the cogito, ‘I think therefore I am,’ Descartes would be making an assumption that everyone knows what it means to think and be. The ‘everybody knows’ discourse is the form of representation and the manner of discourse for that which is being represented. (130)

Deleuze is arguing that the problem with philosophy is its foundation: implicit and subjective presuppositions. ‘Philosophy’ as the medium of casting doubt on assumptions, does not seem to do so at the level of the ‘form’ of philosophizing. In contrast, a person who did not have any presuppositions would be a non-thinking person of ill will for they are the only ones actually beginning and repeating that state of beginning. They have no distinction between subjective or objective presuppositions due to a mistrust for both. (130) Here, it seems we can imply that ‘true’ philosophy would be an unstructured, non-thinking process for it would need to do so if no presuppositions are in place. This begins to sound like madness, Deleuze mentions schizophrenia in this chapter, or sophistry, which is exactly the opposite of wisdom and philosophy. 

According to Deleuze, the philosopher acts as if the meaning of thinking, being and self are all universally recognized. He writes how it is the ‘form’ of representation or recognition, in general, that is an element of thought as a natural exercise, faculty and capacity towards an affinity of truth. Truthfulness within thought incorporates a ‘good will’ from the thinker and high moral value for the thought itself. A generalization that everyone knows what it means to think comes from the assumption that everyone thinks. If someone thinks, then they know the meaning of thinking or how to think. (131) There is an exclusion of error in thought within the assumption or that thoughts can be untrue in their capacity. 

These implicit assumptions, specifically the high moral value on the thought itself, create space for arrogance and overconfidence in the process and product of one’s thoughts. There is a sense of entitlement that comes from the experience of arriving at a conclusion that appears sound to the thinker. People demonstrate this when they pre-text with, ‘I think…the blue team sucks.’ Making a statement in itself has truth value. There is an artificial support for the pretext, ‘I think,’ when someone is expressing the forthcoming statement as a product of ‘their’ thought. What does it matter if this thought came from you? The critical thinker recognizes this as an invalid appeal to authority. Even experts make mistakes. Critical thinking is based on evaluating statements on their own accord and not an appeal to the speaker. There is a sense that if we think, the product of that thought is true. That is the outcome of ‘the thinking,’ truth. But, it is the case, much of thought produces the opposite, falsity. The image of thought, as Deleuze discusses, creates an illusion that truth will be the outcome of our thought, despite the actuality of. 

Common Sense

Deleuze discusses how common sense is the most general form of representation because it attributes high moral conduct and good will to the holder. The presupposition within philosophy is that common sense is a cogito of natural universals or

“Cogitatio natura universalis.” (Deleuze 131) 

Basically, it is natural for people to think in the form of the cogito, therefore we can universalize its form to all people. The action of thinking and an awareness of the thought, is something we implicitly assume for all thinkers and carry with it the moral implications of good will and truthfulness to the thought itself. ‘Common sense’ is a sense that is common to all people. Sense is not ‘sensory data’ or a derivation from the senses, but the capacity to make coherence and draw implications through thought itself. 

From here, is the historical beginnings of philosophy, says Deleuze. There are different ways different philosophers articulate this same point of ‘common sense.’ Each of these philosophers do not explicitly argue for their presuppositions, but they commit the mistake of not questioning this generalized form. Deleuze states,

“Conceptual philosophical thought has as its implicit presupposition a pre-philosophical and natural Image of thought, borrowed from the pure element of common sense.” (Deleuze 131)

Here we see the first use of the phrasing ‘Image of thought,’ where Deleuze comments on how the image itself has an affinity towards the true in formally possessing ‘the true’ and a materializing of true outcomes . The terms of the image includes the presupposition that ‘everybody knows’ how to think and what it means to think. Deleuze argues that as long as philosophy is engaged with this image, it will be prejudiced towards objects, subjects, Being and beings. (131) 

The Image of Thought that Deleuze is discussing is not specific to one or another philosophical position, but a single image that applies to philosophy in general. He identifies the image as dogmatic, orthodox or moral and can be found in the forms like rationalist or empiricist. (131-2) Deleuze references how Nietzsche’s criticism of philosophy’s presuppositions as moral, reinforces the idea of a good will and nature to the image of thought as he states,

“only the good can ground the supposed affinity between thought and the True.” (Deleuze 132)

The morality of the image itself, the thought and the truthfulness within it, is founded upon a moral axiom of goodness. To think is good, because thought produces truth. 

Alternatively, critiquing this image and its implied postulates would essentially be identified as non-philosophical. Though, it would be, as Deleuze says, ‘an ‘authentic repetition’ in thought without Image,’ would mean to give up the form of representation and common sense. Deleuze identifies that true thoughts can only be true thinking when they break away from this ‘Image’ and postulates supporting it. (132) Otherwise, no thoughts are different, but repetitions of the same form. Thoughts without this form, good will of the thinker and truth as a product, is very antithetical to an understanding of philosophy. At a certain point, there becomes a problem of questioning presuppositions turning into a self-defeating practice. A thing’s existence which is orientated towards its own non-existence is a contradictory notion. Humans have the impulse of survival and self-protection, not death and self-destruction. The examination of presuppositions can become counter intuitive, philosophically for sure, if we start to deconstruct the meaning of philosophy such that philosophy does not exist. Philosophy means sense, and if philosophy becomes nonsense through philosophy, how can it be philosophy? Madness. 

Aristotle’s three laws of thought, for example, are in place so that we can arrive at sound reasoning. If we abandon the law of identity for example, we then cannot know that the use of a term in one statement is the same as that term being used in another. We open our reasoning up and allow fallacious thinking or not having the law of identity, then more problems begin to occur. The laws of thought are in place to structure a form of reasoning such that we can develop constructive implications that are internally coherent. Reasoning is a means to an end, which is the image of thought that Deleuze is identifying. Thought, independent of reason, can be arbitrary. 

Thought on part of the human thinker is not always truthful as we see in cognitive behavioural therapy. In CBT, distorted thinking is the prime cause for mental illness, i.e. depression. The depressed person is engaged in a kind of thought that does not have the effect of truth. The lack of truth, seen in the overgeneralizing or all or nothing thinking distortions, is the primary cause of a reduction in self-esteem and pathology. It is through criticizing their thought patterns, dispensing the image of thought with its assumed truthfulness, that the depressed person can get a more realistic view of themselves and their experience. Part of the value in Deleuze’s criticism of the image of thought is it helps the thinker break away from their own dogmatic attachment to the contents and form of their thoughts. The thinker can not blindly accept the product of their thought, but apply critical thinking and/or CBT to their thinking so that they are able to produce healthier thinking patterns. 

We can see how the image of thought can be on two extremes: on the one side, we have dogmatic acceptance and a moral element in the thinker and thoughts, on the other, we have a complete abandonment of truth, common sense, and conceptual analysis. We can see how if a person places themselves on either end of the spectrum, they can end up in problems. The problems of dogmatism or incoherence and inability to reason. The wisdom from Deleuze and his attention to the image of thought cannot be found on either extreme, but somewhere in between in the form of critical thinking and awareness of our thinking patterns. 

Deleuze’s next move is to discuss the nature of thinking. He begins by arguing that thinking is not a natural exercise of a faculty of good will and nature. He cites a common sense wisdom that ‘everybody knows’ people rarely think and are more often captured by impulsiveness than a desire for abstraction or reason. (132) He references Descartes again on his view of good sense, as a capacity for thought, where people complain about their lack of memory, imagination or hearing but always revere their own intelligence and thought process. (132) The problems we face in our cognitive faculties are known in degenerative diseases like Alzheimer's, damage to our sense perception like walking past a loud speaker and having a ringing in our ears or staring into a bright light and having an after image effect distorting our vision. We can determine the fallibility of our senses, shown in the refraction test where we put a pencil in a glass of water to see it is disconnected due to the medium of water changing how we perceive light waves. The thinker and thoughts produced from, carry the implicit assumption of truth and goodness. The labour of thinking has a warranty of truth. Our attachment to that warranty is one of the major issues Deleuze communicates in his critique of the image of thought. The thinker so easily complains about other faculties of mind, but is always so confident of their own thinking process. “But I thought…!?!”

As conscious beings, it may be the case that due to our awareness of our inner dialogue in the process of thought, we arrive at a confidence in those thoughts unlike that of other psychological processes. We do not process the nerve impulse of our hearing, in the same way we do when we ‘go through a thought process.’ We do not observe the psychological process of how light waves change in our perception due to the medium perceived through, as in the case of refraction. In thought, we can explore our thinking through present observation or past reflection. This gives us an inner access to the process and product of our thoughts that may embolden the attachment to the process/outcome of the image of thought. At the very least, Deleuze offers a correct criticism that an awareness that thought may not produce true outcomes. Being aware of the image of thought is not enough, like accepting that someone believes an assumption. ‘Faith’ is not an argument. Conversely, the intentions of the thinker may not be good. What is needed is a means or a step towards being more philosophical and less dogmatic. 

Deleuze communicates how naturally good and common sense are understood as determinations of pure thought; where sense judges its universality and assumes the principle of being universally communicated. He discusses that to apply the mind, or impose this principle, an explicit method is required. This method is common sense, or the use of ‘in principle’ when making assumptions. (133) ‘Thinking,’ seems intuitive, but is actually difficult and rare. ‘In principle,’ thinking is easy, from the perspective of the image of thought. However, in practice, ‘thinking’ is not so easy as we discussed earlier in the arrogance or dogmatism of thought and the lack of critical thinking in our assessment of what is true. 

Deleuze shares how we have ended up in a problem of self-reference, where we cannot use thought as a means to criticize the image of thought. This means that our method to understand the image of thought cannot be found within the contemporary act of ‘thinking,’ for we would be committing the mistake itself, the use of common sense, in our evaluation of the mistake. The presuppositions of the image of thought are found within the empirical and transcendental model, therefore it is here the judgment of the image of thought can be done. (132-3) 

Transcendental Empiricism: Recognition

The transcendental model Deleuze speaks of is recognition. He defines recognition as

“the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object: the same object may be seen, touched, remembered, imagined or conceived.” (Deleuze 133)

Deleuze refers to Descartes' example of wax changing physical state, but still being recognized as the same object. Deleuze states that our faculties of perception, memory, imagination, and understanding each act upon ‘the given’ in their own way in the process of recognition. 

In the case of Descartes wax, we visually see the wax in different states, we remember its previous state and come to an understanding that these different instances are of the same object, just different states. Recognition is transcendental because it is a condition which makes our experience possible. Recognition being transcendental means that the image of thought occurs without our thinking, but is a product of the process of thinking. This places the conditions of the possibility of the image of thought into our cognitive apparatus. It is how our cognition has evolved that established recognition as an empirical transcendental feature of human experience. 

According to Deleuze, object recognition occurs when one of our faculties determines the object is identical to some other, or if all the faculties work together in relating their given in forming an identity of the object. Deleuze states, 

“Recognition thus relies upon a subjective principle of collaboration of the faculties for ‘everybody’ …a common sense as a concordia facultatum…for the philosopher, the form of identity in object relies upon a ground in the unity of a thinking subject, of which all the other faculties must be modalities.” (133) 

Deleuze distinguishes between two modes of recognition, generalized for everyone in the form of common sense and specific to the philosopher as a thinking subject. The common sense mode of recognition is the assumption that everyone else does the same thing. The philosophical orientation of recognition is more in-depth, as it requires unity of the thinker in determining the identity of an object. Common sense is a presupposition in the image of thought as recognition, where we assume that everyone is able to collaborate their faculties in object identification. Philosophically, the thinking subject is assumed to unify the different modes of their faculties so that they can form identity. The first is a generalization that everyone has recognition as a faculty, whereas the second is founded in the unity of the faculties in determining the identity of an object. The first is that the process in general is done by everyone, the second is the mechanism of the process being composed of the unification of faculties creating object identification. 

 The unity of our faculties as subjects is the meaning of the cartesian cogito as a ‘philosophical beginning.’ When a philosopher, let’s say Rene Descartes, goes through the thought process, “I think, therefore I am,” he is unifying his faculties as a subject in the form of an object which reflects one’s own subjective identity. “I” think. “I” exist. The “I” is understood as an objective entity, which is representative of the subject and the subject's identity. It is a different way to describe ‘self-awareness.’ It is not just a mere reflection in a mirror, but a cognition of one as an object/subject identity/unity. A recognition of oneself where the process of recognizing is an existence proof in itself. Descartes awareness within the moment of his own existence as an identifiable subject/object. It is a philosophical beginning because it is supposed to relinquish presuppositions, but as discussed earlier only of the objective, conceptual type. There is a presupposition or assumption of the principle of common sense, which means that others think and they also exist. There is an assumption that the truth a specific person arrives at, can be generalized so that other thinkers can do the same image and arrive at the same truth, via common sense. The cogito as recognition is a philosophical beginning, but, as Deleuze has been challenging, is limited by the empirical transcendental element of recognition itself. 

Our subjective capacity for identity is based on our faculties unifying into what we perceive as an ‘object.’ Deleuze states that this is a philosophical basis for ‘common sense’ and where

“common sense becomes philosophical.” (Deleuze 133)

The philosophical basis of common sense can be found in an apparent soundness to the generalization of ‘everybody knows’ or presuppositions within the ‘I think.’ One can justify common sense transcendentally, as Kant did with apperception, by citing that common sense, as per faculties uniting in the form of recognition, is required for the possibility of experience. One can embrace the subjective presuppositions of common sense as an a priori justification for it. Common sense becomes philosophical here, because it comes down to not being able to go any further in conceptual skepticism, for ‘common sense,’ understood as the transcendental properties that give rise to our cognitive experience, is as far as a conceptually based presupposition can go. Therefore, it is a beginning or basis for philosophy because it can give an illusion that all presuppositions have been wiped away. 

Both Kant and Descartes, the identity of the self, the ‘I think’ for Descartes and apperception for Kant, creates a grounding of harmony for the faculties in forming objects with ‘sameness.’ Sameness can be the epitome of inquiry, like a cogito philosophical beginning, or in simple object recognition. The ‘given’ is what emerges within experience that can be coalesced into an identity formation based on sameness. Each faculty will have its own kind of ‘given’ relative to the medium for which it accesses experience. 

Good Sense

Deleuze then distinguishes between common and good sense. Common Sense establishes what the form of the ‘same’ is. Common sense is composed of 1) The norm for identity from the pure self’s perspective; the norm of what an identity is, and, 2) the corresponding form of an object. Good sense is how each of our faculties contribute in making determinations. Good sense is 1) The norm for how one’s faculties are distributed from the empirical self’s perspective; an ideal balance of the transcendental, and 2) a universal distribution of how objects are qualified as things of different types. (133-4) Common sense is the standard we use to know objects, whereas good sense is the means by which we come to know objects. Both are important in judgment, however Deleuze criticizes any philosophical approach which does not challenge these forms of sense. 

Both good and common sense complete the image of thought as two parts of one doxa/belief. Its postulates are; a) an ‘uprightness’ to the image of thought, where one knows the meaning of ‘to think,’ b) the ‘in principle’ element of common sense is implied, an a priori justification for presuppositions c) Implication of the Recognition Model/Form; comes with acceptance of presuppositions. (134) 

An analogy for ‘uprightness’ is something like an instinct, or force in the ‘correct’ direction. The image of thought, how we understand thought, assumes that people know how to think. The assumption is ‘thinking, by its nature, is oriented in a direction that produces correctness.’ However, only through some evaluation method, like critical thinking, can thinking be compared and contrasted. Someone may have a post-modern view of truth, where they can distort reason, rationalization and lower their bar for intellectual honesty relative to their state or interests. ‘Correct’ thinking, or ‘being reasonable,’ is not something that necessarily comes with thinking in general and is not ‘known’ by all thinkers. There is a quality to thinking that is not implicit in the thinker. 

The ‘in principle’ element of common sense is a generalization towards everyone, that they can perform to some ideal standard or follow the same criteria. Earlier, Deleuze mentions how thinking is easy, ‘in principle,’ from the image of thought. This assumption, like ‘in principle’ everyone knows what it means ‘to be,’ is an unjustified implication drawn from an implicit assumption as discussed earlier in the critique of Descartes cogito. 

Lastly, the form of recognition, as a model in itself of the unification of faculties to determine identity through sameness, means that certain presuppositions are already accepted; i.e., assuming everyone has the same capacity of unification in their process of recognition. 

The natural ‘uprightness’ of thought comes from the fact that it is not a single faculty but the unity of all of them. These faculties are the modes of the subject and correspond to the form of sameness in the recognition model. The image of thought necessarily includes the recognition model which is the root of the problem Deleuze is identifying. He states,

“this model remains sovereign and defines the orientation of the philosophical analysis of what it means to think.” (Deleuze 134)

The presupposition in the process of recognition, through a unity of faculties, is a problem for ‘philosophy,’ as something based in skepticism of assumptions. The transcendental, implicit assumptions, seem to also be relevant to philosophical inquiry. 

This orientation of a thought which is naturally upright, ‘in principle’ common sense, and a recognition model that is transcendental creates a type of philosophical orthodox; a way of being philosophical that cannot break from tradition. No difference, no new beginnings. Philosophy is not actually philosophy; defined as breaking away from assumptions or doxa. The problem is not a specific proposition or belief, but philosophy’s inability to break away from the form, common sense and the recognition model. Deleuze describes the recognition model as a

“harmony of the faculties grounded in the supposedly universal thinking subject and exercised upon the unspecified object.” (Deleuze 134)

The fundamental problem with the recognition model is that philosophers continue to ‘rediscover’ the same ideas and indoctrinates conformity. Recognition is repetition, not difference or something new. Through recognition, philosophy repeats. 

The Image of Cognition 

To offer a solution to the Image of Thought, we may need to broaden our definition of philosophy, relative to the acceptance of the implicit presuppositions. Explicitly, philosophy has been able to develop a robust history of conceptual analysis. However, it is true that philosophy cannot attend to the implicit presuppositions in the same way it does with conceptual assumptions. Deleuze states, 

“When the presupposition of philosophy is found in an Image of thought which is claimed to hold in principle, we can no longer be content to oppose it with contrary facts. The discussion must be carried out on the level of principle itself...this image presupposes a certain distribution of the empirical and the transcendental, and it is this distribution or transcendental model implied by the image that must be judged.” (Deleuze 133) 

What we have here are two different levels of analysis, one of the conceptual and the other the transcendental properties that make the image of thought possible. Those properties are not found in the realm of conceptual analysis, but have correlates in our cognition, neurobiology, and evolution. We have evolved brains that can conceive and critique. The mode of reason and thinking, the image of thought, is created and established by the mind that we have evolved. 

When Deleuze says, ‘it is this distribution or transcendental model…that must be judged,’ he is actually talking about the apparatus which allows for the image of thought to exist at all. That is what transcendental means, the conditions for the possibility of experience. In this context, the conditions for the possibility of the image of thought, the problems and the solution, is in the nature of our minds and cognition. We can see the problems and mistakes that Deleuze is discussing beyond a repetition in the history of philosophy’s false beginnings. The image of thought is the conditions for which our mind produces representations. The output of those conditions do give us correctness and truth, but it is also the source of bias, prejudice, heuristics, cognitive distortions, and some forms of mental illness. 

The only way to counterbalance the image of thought, whether it is to philosophically suspend the postulates and presuppositions of the image of thought, or to mitigate the many biases our brains/minds produce, is through psycho-social intervention.  No single person can combat the limitations of the image of thought or cognitive/mental biases on their own. The very nature of a bias is that we cannot see our own error, unless trained to do so, and even then we are still infallible. This means that raising the philosophical context from an individual thinker, to a group of critical thinkers, is the only means of bias mitigation and inter-group regulation that can help break the illusion of the image of thought, cognitive limitations and dogmatic beliefs. 

Humans may have evolved with a certain kind of cognitive structure, but we can practice a meta-philosophical orientation that is social in nature, to broaden the meaning of ‘philosophy.’ Since the image of thought paralyzes the thinker in a cloud of illusory repetition, it is possible that positively socializing external feedback, instead of blind dogmatic conformity, can mitigate our cognitive limitations that give rise to the image of thought itself.  If the image of thought has assumptions that are based implicitly in the form of our thought, then the image of thought is rooted in our cognition as a species. It is in that cognition and meta-social-cognition, we can find answers. 

Conclusion

Deleuze begins his discussion of the image of thought with reference to Descartes cogito as a prototype example of how philosophy fails in its fundamental trajectory. Philosophy begins, as mathematics does, in defining terms. In that inventorying of ideas, uncovering assumptions and presuppositions has been a mark of excellence in philosophers. Even in the cogito, Deleuze shows how Descartes, and other philosophers before and after him, were not able to fully question or apply skepticism towards assumptions of their discourse, inquiry or discussion. This was due to not being aware of the implicit assumptions in the form of common sense 'everybody knows’ to the manner our minds process identity through recognition. If starting new is a difference, there was only a repetition of pseudo-difference in the history of philosophy due to not addressing the Image of thought. 

If it is the case that the conditions for the possibility of our experience is in the mechanism of how our minds function and evolve, we cannot rely on implicit assumptions to remove us from the problems of those mechanisms. I argue that only a supra or higher order sense of ‘philosophy’ as a community which uses social mechanisms to counterbalance our cognitive limitations, can the image of thought and cognitive biases be corrected. Meta-Philosophy changes what ‘common sense’ is.

References 

Deleuze, Gilles. Difference & Repetition. Columbia University Press, 1994 

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